President Donald Trump’s administration has expanded its campaign against the International Criminal Court, sanctioning the court’s president and one of its senior trial lawyers as Washington intensifies efforts to weaken an institution it says has no authority over Americans or officials of allied countries that have not accepted its jurisdiction. But the latest sanctions raise a question extending far beyond the ICC.

How can sanctions issued by the United States significantly affect a Japanese judge or Senegalese lawyer working for an international court in the Netherlands?

The answer reveals one of the United States’ most powerful geopolitical tools: much of the global economy depends, directly or indirectly, on American financial institutions, technology companies and access to the U.S. market. That dependence allows a decision made in Washington to produce consequences thousands of miles outside American territory. It also raises another question.

If the United States repeatedly demonstrates that dependence on American systems can be transformed into political leverage, how long before governments, businesses and international institutions begin investing more seriously in alternatives?

Washington Targets the President of the ICC

Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced Aug. 18 that the United States was sanctioning Tomoko Akane, the Japanese judge who serves as president of the International Criminal Court, and Abdoulaye Seye, a Senegalese senior trial lawyer in the court’s Office of the Prosecutor.

Rubio said both had participated in ICC efforts to investigate or prosecute officials whose governments had not consented to the court’s jurisdiction.

The sanctions are part of a much broader campaign.

With the latest designations, nine of the ICC’s 18 judges have been sanctioned by the United States, along with both deputy prosecutors, former prosecutor Karim Khan and another prosecution staff member, according to the court. International Criminal Court

The administration has made clear that it isn’t finished.

Rubio has described the ICC as a politicized institution that threatens American sovereignty, and the administration has been pressuring countries that belong to the court to withdraw from it. Reuters reports that at least five member states have announced plans to leave in recent months. Reuters

The ICC responded by calling the latest sanctions a “flagrant attack” on the independence of the court and warning that targeting judges and prosecutors for carrying out their duties undermines the rule of law. International Criminal Court

Why Is the United States Fighting the ICC?

The dispute has a long history, and the jurisdictional issue underlying it deserves more explanation than the political rhetoric surrounding it often receives.

The International Criminal Court was established under the Rome Statute, which entered into force in 2002. The court prosecutes individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression under circumstances falling within its jurisdiction.

The United States has never become a party to the Rome Statute. Neither has Israel. The Trump administration argues that the ICC therefore has no legitimate authority to investigate, arrest or prosecute American or Israeli officials without their governments’ consent. The ICC takes a different position.

Its legal framework can allow the court to exercise jurisdiction based on where an alleged crime occurred, including when the accused is a citizen of a country that hasn’t joined the court. That distinction is critical to understanding the conflict.

Washington’s argument essentially focuses on the sovereignty of countries that never agreed to place their nationals under ICC authority.

The court’s position is that nationality isn’t necessarily decisive when alleged crimes occur within territory over which the ICC has jurisdiction.

The disagreement became particularly explosive after the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in connection with alleged crimes arising from the war in Gaza. Israel strongly rejects the allegations and the court’s jurisdiction. The United States rejected the warrants as well.

Trump subsequently issued Executive Order 14203 in February 2025, establishing the sanctions framework his administration is now using against ICC personnel. OFAC identifies the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and National Emergencies Act as underlying statutory authorities for the sanctions program. OFAC

What Does Being Sanctioned Actually Mean?

This is where the story becomes much larger than a fight between Washington and an international court.

Someone designated under the sanctions can have property and financial interests within U.S. jurisdiction blocked and can effectively be cut off from the American financial system. For an American living in the United States, the implications are fairly intuitive. For an ICC official living and working in Europe, they might seem much less obvious. After all, the ICC isn’t headquartered in Washington. It’s headquartered in The Hague. Akane is Japanese. Seye is Senegalese.

So why should an American financial sanction dramatically affect either one while they’re outside the United States? Because the American financial system doesn’t end at the American border.

Reuters notes that the sanctions largely shut designated officials out of the U.S. financial system, to which most internationally operating banks have close ties. Reuters

That’s the key. A bank doesn’t necessarily need to be headquartered in New York to care deeply about what the U.S. Treasury Department says.

The Dollar Gives Washington Enormous Reach

Consider a hypothetical European bank. It operates under European law. Its customer lives in Europe. A transaction begins in Europe and may even end in Europe. At first glance, Washington might appear irrelevant.

But that bank may also conduct business in U.S. dollars, maintain relationships with American correspondent banks, serve American customers, operate subsidiaries in the United States or otherwise require access to U.S. financial markets. International dollar transactions can involve American financial institutions even when neither the sender nor recipient is American.

Now imagine that bank has to choose between maintaining an account for one sanctioned ICC official and protecting its ability to interact with the world’s largest economy and one of the world’s most important financial systems. The commercial calculation can become obvious. The United States doesn’t necessarily have to order every bank on Earth to close the account.

It can make doing business with a sanctioned person sufficiently risky that institutions decide for themselves that the relationship isn’t worth keeping. And institutions sometimes go farther than American law strictly requires.

That’s known as over-compliance: rather than determine precisely which transactions might technically be permitted, a company eliminates the sanctioned relationship altogether to minimize its exposure.

That risk-aversion dramatically amplifies the practical reach of sanctions.

American Technology Extends That Power Even Further

Banking isn’t the only dependency. Modern international organizations rely heavily on American technology companies. Cloud infrastructure. Email. Productivity software. Payment processors. Communications platforms. Cybersecurity products.

A government, company or international organization can operate entirely outside the United States while still depending on services supplied by corporations headquartered there.

That creates another route through which American law can reach beyond American territory.

Human Rights Watch, which is currently challenging the ICC sanctions in federal court, says sanctioned individuals can lose access not only to financial transactions but also to technology services, collaborations and other forms of engagement. Human Rights Watch

This isn’t merely theoretical.

Previous sanctions against ICC personnel have already demonstrated that actions directed at individuals in Europe can disrupt ordinary professional and financial relationships well beyond the United States.

The result is an unusual form of geopolitical power.

Washington doesn’t need sovereignty over The Hague to influence what services are available to someone living there.

It needs leverage over institutions that person depends upon.

America’s Allies Don’t Necessarily Agree

The latest sanctions have created another awkward situation for some of Washington’s closest partners. Japan responded unusually critically after its citizen and ICC President Tomoko Akane was sanctioned.

Japan’s government called the American action “very unfortunate” and reaffirmed its longstanding support for the court and its mission of prosecuting serious international crimes. Reuters

The Netherlands, which hosts the ICC, also opposed the sanctions and reaffirmed its support for the institution. Germany similarly criticized the measures. AP News

That creates a strange geopolitical contradiction. European governments can declare:

We support the International Criminal Court.

Their banks and companies may nevertheless conclude:

We cannot risk doing business with the people who operate it.

Those positions can coexist because governments and private institutions are making different calculations. A government may object to Washington’s policy as a matter of sovereignty or international law.

A multinational corporation must consider whether defying the practical consequences of American sanctions threatens its access to U.S. markets, financial infrastructure or customers. Political opposition doesn’t eliminate economic exposure.

The Fight Is Now Reaching American Courts

The administration’s sanctions campaign is also facing resistance inside the United States. Three sanctioned ICC judges sued Trump administration officials in June, arguing that the measures imposed against them are unlawful. Reuters

Then, on Aug. 11, Human Rights Watch, the American Friends Service Committee, Center for Constitutional Rights and Open Society Institute filed another federal lawsuit challenging the sanctions regime.

Those organizations argue that the restrictions interfere with their ability to communicate and work with ICC officials while documenting atrocities and pursuing international accountability.

They contend that the sanctions violate constitutional protections and unlawfully interfere with their work.

The administration rejects that argument and maintains that the sanctions are necessary to protect American and Israeli sovereignty from a court Washington believes is acting outside its legitimate authority. AP News

The lawsuits therefore introduce another important question. The dispute isn’t only about whether Washington can economically isolate foreign ICC officials.

American courts may also have to determine how far the government can go in restricting what Americans themselves can do with those officials.

The ICC Isn’t Universally Accepted

Criticism of the sanctions shouldn’t obscure another important fact: the ICC has never enjoyed universal acceptance. The United States isn’t a member. Neither are several other major powers. Governments have long raised questions about the court’s jurisdiction, effectiveness and relationship with national sovereignty. Washington’s objection to ICC authority over Americans also predates Trump’s current administration.

So this shouldn’t be reduced to a simplistic argument in which one side supports international justice and the other opposes it. There is a genuine dispute over the limits of an international court’s authority when people accused of crimes come from countries that never accepted the treaty establishing that court. But the Trump administration has moved beyond simply refusing to recognize ICC jurisdiction.

It is now using American economic power to impose consequences on the people operating the court and encouraging member states to abandon the institution entirely.That’s what makes the current confrontation different.

The Sanctions Work Because the World Wants Access to America

There is a larger irony underlying all of this. American sanctions are extraordinarily powerful because the world values access to American institutions. Foreign banks want access to dollars and U.S. financial markets. Multinational corporations want American customers. International organizations use American technology. Investors want access to U.S. capital. Companies want relationships with American banks.

That dependence gives Washington something far more powerful than the ability to freeze a bank account physically located inside the United States.

It gives Washington the ability to force institutions elsewhere to ask whether a particular customer, transaction or relationship is worth jeopardizing their access to America.

Often, the answer is no. That’s why a sanction issued in Washington can affect a Japanese judge working at a court in the Netherlands. And that’s why sanctions have become one of America’s most formidable nonmilitary foreign-policy tools.

But Using That Power May Come With a Long-Term Cost

The same mechanism that makes American sanctions powerful also creates their potential vulnerability. Their reach depends partly on other countries and companies continuing to depend on systems Washington can influence.

Every time the United States demonstrates that dependence can become political leverage, it also demonstrates the strategic value of reducing that dependence. That doesn’t mean the dollar is about to disappear as a major global currency.

It doesn’t mean European banks are about to sever ties with American finance. It doesn’t mean governments can easily replace American technology. And it certainly doesn’t mean alternatives can be created overnight.

The scale and depth of American financial markets make simplistic predictions about an imminent end to U.S. economic influence difficult to justify. But countries don’t have to eliminate their dependence on the United States for American leverage to diminish. They only have to reduce it.

Alternative payment infrastructure, greater use of other currencies, domestic technology providers, diversified financial relationships and stronger regional institutions can each reduce the number of points at which Washington possesses unilateral leverage.

That creates a strategic paradox:

The more effectively the United States demonstrates the power created by global dependence on American systems, the more clearly it demonstrates why other countries might want alternatives to those systems.

We’ve Seen This Question Somewhere Else

That dynamic isn’t limited to sanctions. Canada is currently attempting to diversify its trading relationships while openly acknowledging that its previous level of economic dependence on the United States creates vulnerability.

American allies have increasingly debated whether they need greater independent defense capacity. Europe has spent years discussing strategic autonomy in areas ranging from energy to technology.

These aren’t identical issues, and they shouldn’t be treated as evidence of some coordinated global abandonment of the United States. They do, however, share a common underlying calculation.

What happens when dependence on an ally becomes a source of vulnerability?

For Canada, the concern is trade. For European governments, it may involve defense, technology or energy.

For an international court headquartered in the Netherlands, the latest sanctions demonstrate just how much American financial and technological power can matter even when the United States isn’t a member of the institution.

American Power Extends Far Beyond America’s Borders

The controversy surrounding the ICC will continue to focus heavily on Gaza, Israel, sovereignty and the legitimacy of the court itself.

Those debates matter.

But the sanctions against Tomoko Akane and Abdoulaye Seye reveal something much larger about the modern international system.

The United States doesn’t need formal jurisdiction over someone to dramatically affect that person’s economic life.

It doesn’t need to control a foreign bank if that bank depends on access to institutions America does control.

It doesn’t need to regulate every technology provider if enough critical services are supplied by American companies.

And it doesn’t need every allied government to agree with its policy if private institutions conclude that resisting Washington carries too much financial risk.

That is an extraordinary amount of geopolitical power.

It is also power that depends, at least partly, on the rest of the world continuing to participate in systems in which the United States occupies a uniquely influential position.

The Trump administration is demonstrating just how potent that position can be.

The question for Washington is whether repeatedly demonstrating that power ultimately strengthens American influence—or gives governments that disagree with American policy another reason to find ways around it.

Sources & Editorial Note

This article is based on current reporting from Reuters and the Associated Press, official information from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, statements from the International Criminal Court, and material concerning ongoing legal challenges to the sanctions.

The article distinguishes between the Trump administration’s position on ICC jurisdiction and the court’s competing legal position. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, but the ICC maintains that its jurisdiction can extend to crimes allegedly committed on territory falling within its jurisdiction even when the accused is a national of a nonmember state. Reuters

Discussion of banks, technology providers and corporate risk decisions explains mechanisms through which U.S. sanctions can have effects outside U.S. territory. It should not be interpreted to mean that every foreign institution is legally required to comply with every U.S. sanction. The distinction between direct legal obligations and voluntary or risk-driven over-compliance is important.

Analysis concerning incentives to reduce dependence on American financial and technological infrastructure describes a potential long-term consequence, not a prediction that the dollar, American banking system or U.S. technology companies are about to lose their central international roles.

Primary and supporting sources: U.S. Treasury Department/OFAC; International Criminal Court; Reuters; Associated Press; Human Rights Watch.